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A unanimous panel of the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the 8th Circuit ruled 
on July 16 in InterVarsity Christian 
Fellowship/USA v. University of Iowa, 
2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 21127, 2021 WL 
3008743, that University of Iowa officials 
could not claim qualified immunity as 
a defense against their discriminatory 
application of the University’s Human 
Rights Policy to InterVarsity Christian 
Fellowship, whose registered student 
organization (RSO) status they revoked 
as part of an apparent campaign to 
strike at organizations that effectively 
barred LGBT students from leadership 
positions. Circuit Judge Jonathan Kobes 
(who was appointed by President Donald 
J. Trump), wrote for the panel, whose 
other members were James Loken 
(appointed by George W. Bush) and L. 
Steven Grasz (also appointed by Donald 
J. Trump). The court affirmed a ruling 
finding a First Amendment violation 
and denying qualified immunity by 
District Judge Stephanie Rose.
In previous unrelated litigation, also 
before Judge Rose, the University was 
sued by Business Leaders in Christ 
(BLinC), a student organization that 
had lost its RSO status after a student 
filed a complaint in 2017 under the 
University’s Human Rights Policy, 
complaining that BLinC had denied 
him the opportunity to seek a leadership 
role despite his Christian faith because 
he would not formally subscribe to the 
group’s belief that same-sex relationship 
were “against the Bible.” In effect, he 
charged that gay people were effectively 
excluded from leadership positions. In 
the ensuing litigation, the Judge Rose 
issued a preliminary injunction, finding 
that BLinC was likely to prevail on its 
claim that its free speech rights had 
been violated by the University. 
“In response to the preliminary 
injunction,” wrote Judge Kobes, “the 
university through its Center for Student 
Involvement and Leadership, began a 
‘Student Org Clean Up Proposal’ and 
reviewed all RSO constitutions to bring 
them into compliance with the Human 
Rights Policy . . . Reviewers were told 
to ‘look at religious student groups first’ 
for language that required leaders to 
affirm certain religious beliefs. Around 
the same time the reviewers turned their 
focus to religious groups, the University 
amended the Human Rights Policy 
to expressly exempt sororities and 
fraternities from the policy prohibiting 
sex discrimination. But the University 
did deregister 38 student groups – mostly 
for failure to submit updated documents 
– and several were deregistered for 
requiring their leaders to affirm 
statements of faith.” Does it sound like 
the University was targeting religious 
organizations for enforcement? Does 
it sound like a case where there would 
likely be a slam-dunk ruling against the 
University in the U.S. Supreme Court as 
presently constituted, by at least a vote 
of 6-3 and possibly unanimously? Are 
these mere rhetorical questions?
One of the groups cut up in this 
targeted review was InterVarsity, which 
had been active at the University for 
over twenty-five years, and which is 
affiliated with a national ministry to 
“establish university-based witnessing 
communities of students and faculty 
who follow Jesus as Savior and lord, 
and who are growing in love for God, 
God’s Word, and God’s people of every 
ethnicity land culture.” You guessed it: 
“God’s Word” requires condemnation of 
homosexuality, so far as InterVarsity is 
concerned. When a student challenged 
InterVarsity’s constitution under the 
Human Rights Policy in June 2018, 
the group’s leader argued that the 
constitution did not prevent anyone 
from joining if they did not subscribe 
to the group’s faith, as “only its 
leaders were required to affirm their 
statement of faith.” The University’s 
coordinator of Student Development 
responded that “having a restriction on 
leadership related to religious beliefs 
is contradictory” to the Human Rights 
Policy.
In other words, the University, which 
deregistered InterVarsity when it refused 
to back down, was proceeding as if the 
preliminary injunction requiring it to 
continue BLinC’s registration pending 
a ruling in that case did not exist. No 
surprise, then, that the District Court 
concluded on a summary judgment 
motion that the University had violated 
the First Amendment Free Speech 
rights of InterVarsity, and that the 
University officials involved would not 
enjoy qualified immunity from personal 
liability for violating the organizations 
1st Amendment rights.
What boggles the mind – considering 
that University officials presumably have 
access to legal counsel, and that legal 
counsel would do at least a minimum 
amount of research before advising 
them – is that any university situated in 
the states of the 8th Circuit would think 
they can get away with something like 
this. The 8th Circuit has eleven active 
judges. One was appointed by Barack 
Obama. All the rest were appointed by 
George H.W. Bush, George W. Bush, 
and Donald Trump (who appointed four 
of them). And, of course, the Supreme 
Court now has a super majority of 
religious free exercise and free speech 
enthusiasts, who would probably see 
no need to grant a cert petition by the 
University in this case, being deeply 
engaged in a program of widening the 
scope of the Free Exercise Clause. 
The court makes it clear that this 
case is totally distinguishable from 
the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in 
Christian Legal Society Chapter of UC 
Hastings College of Law v. Martinez, 
561 U.S. 661, in which Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, proceeding from a 
factual stipulation in that case that the 
Law School’s antidiscrimination policy 
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provided that any student was entitled 
to join and seek to lead any registered 
student organization (the so-called 
“all comers policy”), rejected a 1st 
Amendment challenge by CLS to the 
Law School’s withdrawal of recognition 
over this very issue. The University 
of Iowa does not have an “all comers” 
policy, found the 8th Circuit panel, as 
the University, ironically, had formally 
excused sororities and fraternities 
from complying with the ban on 
sex discrimination, and had allowed 
numerous other student organizations 
to categorically exclude students from 
membership based on characteristics 
listed in the Human Rights Policy. 
On the issue of qualified immunity, 
the District Court had taken the position 
that denial of immunity was clear-cut as 
it had found in its prior ruling in BLinC 
that the Human Rights Policy as applied 
to a group whose constitution resembled 
InterVarsity’s in relevant respects 
probably violated the 1st Amendment. 
The 8th Circuit panel rejected this 
reasoning, pointing out that a prior 
ruling by the same District Court could 
not be the basis for denying qualified 
immunity, since district court rulings 
are not binding as precedents. However, 
it pointed out, there was plenty of 
appellate precedent in the 8th Circuit, in 
sister circuits, and even recent Supreme 
Court cases that would justify denying 
qualified immunity to the University 
administrators involved in a decision 
regarding deregistering InterVarsity 
on these facts. “The Supreme Court 
has clearly stated that universities may 
not single out groups because of their 
viewpoint,” wrote Kobes. “Our own 
precedent [in upholding the qualified 
immunity ruling in the BLinC case] 
clearly establishes this is a violation 
of the 1st Amendment. Out-of-circuit 
decision also define the selective 
application of a nondiscrimination 
policy against religious groups as a 
violation of the First Amendment.” 
And, while acknowledging that in 
some contexts, it may be difficult to 
deal with the intersection of the First 
Amendment and anti-discrimination 
principles, the court tellingly quoted 
Justice Clarence Thomas commenting 
on denial of cert earlier in July in 
Hoggard v. Rhodes: “Why should 
university officers, who have time to 
make calculated choices about enacting 
or enforcing unconstitutional policies, 
receive the same protection as a police 
officer who makes a split-second 
decision to use force in a dangerous 
setting?” 
“Because the University and 
individual defendants violated 
InterVarsity’s First Amendment rights, 
the question is whether their actions 
satisfy strict scrutiny,” wrote Kobes, 
addressing the merits. “The University 
‘can survive strict scrutiny only if it 
advances ‘interests of the highest order’ 
and is narrowly tailored to achieve those 
interests,’” he continued, quoting from 
Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 593 U.S. 
__ (2021), hot off the presses, having 
been decided just a month previously. In 
InterVarsity, the 8th circuit panel found 
the lack of a compelling government 
interest coupled with a lack of narrow 
tailoring, because the University “did not 
meaningfully consider less-restrictive 
alternatives to deregistration.”
“On appeal,” he continued, “the 
University and individual defendants do 
not try to argue their actions survive strict 
scrutiny. That is wise. Of course, the 
University has a compelling interest in 
preventing discrimination. But it served 
that compelling interest by picking and 
choosing what kind of discrimination 
was okay. Basically, some RSOs at the 
University of Iowa may discriminate in 
selecting their leaders and members, but 
others, mostly religious, may not.” The 
court pointed out that the University 
could have adopted an “all comers” 
policy, but had not done so, and it 
offered no compelling reason for letting 
some RSOs discriminate on various 
grounds but denying an exception to 
religious RSOs. Again, the court cited 
Fulton on this point, in which the 
Supreme Court found that Philadelphia 
failed to presenting a compelling reason 
for not granting an exception to it’s 
the contractual non-discrimination 
policy – for which the city retained sole 
discretion in its contract with Catholic 
Social Services – when there were two 
dozen other agencies in Philadelphia 
that would provide the services to 
same-sex couples and CSS had been 
operating without any complaints about 
its services for decades. 
“What the University did here 
was clearly unconstitutional,” Kobes 
reiterated in conclusion. “It targeted 
religious groups for differential 
treatment under the Human Rights 
Policy – while carving out exemptions 
and ignoring other violative groups with 
missions they presumably supported. 
The University and individual 
defendants turned a blind eye to decades 
of First Amendment jurisprudence 
or they proceeded full speed ahead 
knowing they were violating the law. 
Either way, qualified immunity provides 
no safe haven.” ■
